Agents are Forever: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Pertaining to the Western Front, North Sea, and Britain During the First World War — Presentation Detail — Celebration of Scholars

Instructions

Student presentations must have a faculty sponsor.

Abstracts must include a title and a description of the research, scholarship, or creative work. The description should be 150-225 words in length and constructed in a format or style appropriate for the presenter’s discipline.

The following points should be addressed within the selected format or style for the abstract:

A clear statement of the problem or question you pursued, or the scholarly goal or creative theme achieved in your work.
A brief comment about the significance or uniqueness of the work.
A clear description of the methods used to achieve the purpose or goals for the work.
A statement of the conclusions, results, outcomes, or recommendations, or if the work is still in progress, the results you expect to report at the event.

Presenter photographs should be head and shoulder shots comparable to passport photos.

Additional Information

More information is available at carthage.edu/celebration-scholars/. The following are members of the Research, Scholarship, and Creativity Committee who are eager to listen to ideas and answer questions:

Jun Wang
Kim Instenes
John Kirk
Nora Nickels
Andrew Pustina
James Ripley

Agents are Forever: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Pertaining to the Western Front, North Sea, and Britain During the First World War

Name: Thomas Williams
Major: History
Hometown: Berwyn, IL
Faculty Sponsor:
Other Sponsors:
Type of research: Senior thesis

Abstract

The historiography on intelligence during the First World War currently lacks sufficient detail. Historian John Keegan in The First World War concluded that length of the war was dependent upon outdated tactics with modern technology. This paper argues British intelligence and counter-intelligence had been vital, but failed to shorten the war until properly implemented. Military commanders, due to their own arrogance, failed to implement intelligence that could have shortened the war, amounting to fewer casualties. Historians such as Alan Judd, Michael Occleshaw, Christopher Andrew, and Paul Gannon graze this issue, but discussion is scant. This manuscript relies on current secondary research, but also incorporates new data from documents not currently used by prominent intelligence historians. This research argues that the arrogance of British commanders resulted in a conflict that was longer than necessary, given correct intelligence on German divisions. Meaningful results were achieved only when British commanders adopted strategies suited to the intelligence.

Poster file