Abstract

The Vietnam War is a sensitive topic for most Americans, especially for those who were directly and indirectly affected by the conflict. Because of personal experiences and stories told, many people know what happened in the jungles and what came as a result of the War. However, not everyone is familiar with the foundations of the Vietnam conflict and the origins of the War. In the White House, advisers used persuasive arguments and supportive evidence to promote their position on the subject. Although it is tempting to believe that the facts would have been enough to persuade or dissuade the Presidents, evidence shows that who was speaking had more influence than what they said.

The semester was spent examining documents—the Foreign Relations of the United States such as memorandum, telegrams and letters as well as National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting notes and tape recordings—and analyzing books and articles written by experts in the field. This project concludes that more than facts, it was the type of relationship that the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under Secretary of State George Ball had with Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson that determined how policy was implemented in the White House from 1960 until 1965.